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MELVIN WOOD, LAVORA S.
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WEATHERSON, CHARLES WOOD
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BRIANT E. ASHBY, ISABELL C.
ASHBY, LEROY CHRISTENSEN
and WILMA C. CHRISTENSEN,
'
Defendants and
Appellants.

APPELLANTS• BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is an appeal from a judgment in the District
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, rendered by Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge. Throughout this brief
the parties will be referred to as plaintiffs and defendants as they were in the trial court.
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On May 27th, 1949, the plaintiffs filed an action
against the above named defendants, and also included
Chester R. Ashby and Clara E. Ashby as parties defendant. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, however,
the action was dismissed as to the latter, and no appeal
has been taken from the dismissal.
In their complaint the plaintiffs allege ownership of
the following described real estate in Davis County, State
of Utah:
A part of the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Meridan, U.S. Survey: Beginning at
a point 10 rods and 7 feet, more or less, East from
the Southwest corner of said quarter section, being
9 feet West of a certain cement well, and running
then North 3 rods, thence East 1 rod, then South
¥2 rod, thence East 49 rods, more or less, to the end
of the pipe line, thence South 2¥2 rods, more or
less, thence West 50 rods, more or less, to the place
of beginning.
Together with the right of way over a strip of land
¥2 rod wide adjoining the above described tract of
land and said pipe line on the North, subject, however, to a right of way for road purposes across the
above described premises.
Plaintiffs base their title upon a certain deed executed and delivered by John Traugott and wife to James
G. Wood, a copy of which is attached to plaintiffs' complaint as Exhibit A, and a certified copy of which is in
evidence a.s plaintiffs' Exhibit B.
The deed in question, in addition to the foregoing
description, contains the following provisions:
( 1)

''In case of repairs to said pipeline by the
2
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Grantee herein, work must be completed in a reasonable
length of time.''
( 2)

•' There is also conveyed with said land all of

the right and title to all waters, drainage or springs
from the South half of the Southwest Quarter of Section
36, the said Grantor, his successors and assigns granteeing full protection to said pipeline from trees, shrubery
or willows or anything that would hinder or obstruct the
free flow of water in same, also full protection from
barns, corals, outhouses or filth of any kind that would
1nake the water unfit for culinary purposes.''
The plaintiffs also allege in their complaint that they
and their predecessors in interest have been in adverse
possession of the property since February 6th, 1907, and
have continually paid taxes thereon. They further allege
that the property in question was purchased, and has
been maintained, for the purpose of obtaining water
therefrom, and allege that the defendants have been
guilty of acts tending to pollute the water supply.
The plaintiffs further allege that they attempted to
build a fence along the North side of the pipeline, and
that the defendants have torn down the fence and continued to cross the land claimed by the plaintiffs.
To get in mind the true picture, it is essential to understand the location of the land in question and its importance to the defendants.
It will be observed from the deed, Exhibit A, and
from the description hereinbefore set forth that the
strip of land specifically in controversy is about 2¥2 rods
in width and about 50 rods in length. However, the
court found (Findings page 4, paragraph 1) that part
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of the said 2lf2 rods is contained in a public highway. As
a matter of fact, the tract of land particularly involved
in this dispute is only about one rod in width after the
part in the highway is deducted. That rod lies between
the pipeline referred to and a public ditch on the South
extending East and West along the North boundary of
the public highway. Immediately North of, or rather
included within the North margin of this one rod, is a
drain pipe, installed by the predecessors of the plaintiffs
to catch underground drainage water which is collected
in a small cistern and piped some distance to the pren1ises
of the plaintiffs. This drainage pipe lies under the surface of the ground at depths varying from ten feet to
twenty-five feet (TR 63). It is conceded by the plaintiffs
that the use of this strip of land for right of way purposes does not in any way interfere with plaintiffs' water
rigths or the quality of their water (TR 63) and it is
alleged in plaintiffs' complaint that ''The said property
was purchased and has been maintained for the purpose
of obtaining water from certain springs thereon'' (Complaint page 3 paragraph 12).
The property of the appealing defendants lies immediately to the North or the plaintiffs' pipeline. The
land of the defendants Ashby is about 275 feet in depth
and about 523 feet in length, except, that prior to the filing of this action, the defendants Ashby had contracted to
sell to one Mikesell a tract of land 92.8 feet in width and
about 210 feet in depth, abutting on the highway to the
South, and located substantially in the center of the Ashby
property (TR 114). Mikesell was not made a party to
the action although he was in possession at the time the
suit was filed (TR 114). The only means of access which
4
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the defendants haYe to the public highway running East
and ''Test, South of the land in controversy, is across the
one rod strip in question.
The defendants Christensen o'vn a tract of land running 213.25 feet East and West and 119.6 feet in width
lying i1n1nediately East of the Ashby property and abutting on the narro"\v strip of land in controversy. Upon
this land the Christensens built a home in 1949. They
have lived there ever since (TR 96 and 97). They paid
the taxes on their land, including that portion of the
land in controversy extending in front of their home, for
the year 1949. They must cross the one-rod strip of land
in order to get to the public highway -on the South
(TR 102). They have installed, and have used, outdoor
sanitation facilities ever since they have been in possession of the property (TR 100). There is no testimony
'vhatever that any use which the Christensens have made
of the property has in any way tended to pollute the water
source of the plaintiffs, or to interfere in any manner
with the water right claimed by the plaintiffs. The
conveyance from Ashbys to Christensens includes that
part of the one-rod strip extending East and West, and
lying South of the Christensen home.
The principal issue in this case simmers down to the
respective rights of the plaintiffs and the appealing defendants in the narrow strip of land about a rod wide
extending along the Southern boundary of the land
owned by the appealing defendants Ashby and Christensen. Obviously, there can be no issue as to the two rods
which constitute a part of the public highway. There is
no question but that the plaintiffs and their predecessors
in interest have piped away certain drainage water over
5
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a long period of years through the drainage pipe installed
under the surface of the North boundary of the rod of land
involved herein. There is, of course, included in this case
the additional issue of use to be made of the land belonging to the appealing defendants which lies entirely North
of the pipeline.
All the land referred to in the pleadings lies within
the corporate limits of the city of Clearfield (TR 68).
Prior to the time that the appealing defendants
Ashby purchased their property in 1947, it had been
used as a farm and orchard, except that part on the
Southwest corner occupied by the residence and outbuildings now belonging to Chester Ashby. There never
has been a fence between the one rod strip and the
property to the North. Over a period of years pigs,
chickens, cattle and horses were kept on the property
to the North in the near vicinity of the pipeline, and
animals roamed at large over the property including
the property in controversy (TR 34).
The Ashbys and their predecessors in interest
travelled East and West over the one rod strip to and
from the orchard and other property lying to the East
(TR 33; 145).
Since the Ashby and Christensen property is now
located in Clearfield City, its greatest value lies in its
use for building lots and the construction of homes (TR
113). Such use, of course, necessitates access to the
public highway on the South. In order to get to that
highway, it is necessary to cross the one-rod strip of
land.
The court in its findings found that the plaintiffs
6
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and their predecessors in interest for 1nore than forty
years had been the owners and in possession of, not
only the one rod in question, but of that portion lying
\rithin the public highway (Findings page 2 paragraph
8). 'rhe court further found that the defendants Christensen, ''have no right, title or interest and no right
to use the property clai1ned by the plaintiffs as a highway nor for a right of way in connection with the use
of the property claimed'' by them (Findings of Fact
page 8, paragraph 1).

In the conclusions of law the court finds that the
appealing defendants Ashby are entitled to a right of
way for road purposes crossing the land in controversy
'·at a point approximately one-half of the distance between the East and West point where the gate exists
in the said fence."
In the decree the court quieted the title of the plaintiffs in a tract of land 2¥2 rods in width and 50 rods in
length. This tract includes half of the public road in use
by the public generally since time immemorial.
The court further decreed that all the appealing defendants are ''permanently restrained from molesting
or using the property in any manner contrary to. the
deed dated February 6, 1907," and directing the defendants ''to remove any and all items which may pollute the water supply to a reasonable distance from said
property." There are, however, no findings or conclusions as to what may pollute or what has polluted
the water.
In fact the court went ''all out'' and ignored the
real provisions of the deed of 1907 reserving the right
7
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of way across the land in controversy.
The effect of the decree is to deprive the Christensens of their right of way to the public road to the South;
to prevent those who have purchased land to the North
and East of the Christensens from using the road which
they have heretofore used in gaining access to the public
road to the South, and prevent the crossing of the strip
of land in question at all except at a point approximately half way between the well and the East end of
the strip described in the old Traugott deed. 'That obviously means that the Christensens and those East and
North of them find themselves completely land-locked.
It also means that the defendants can not even travel
East and West over the strip of land in question as they
have always heretofore crossed it. It further means that
it is impossible to make any other use of the defendants'
land except for farming and that in one tract, because
with any subdivision there must be a right of way across
the strip in question for each owner. Clearly, the real
effect of the court's decision is to land-lock the land of
the appealing defendants so as to enable the plaintiffs
to make defendants' property inaccessible and comparatively valueless.
ST.._t\.TEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON FOR
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT
The points relied upon by appellants for reversal of
the judgment of the lower court are as follows:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF
·THE TRAUGOTT DEED (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT B) IN
THAT THE COURT PLACED AN UNWARRANTED AND

8
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UNREASONABLE CONSTRUCTION UPON SAID DEED
BY LIMITING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE ONE
ROD STRIP OF LAND TO A POINT NEAR THE CENTER
OF THE ASHBY PROPERTY, AND EXCLUDING THE
APPEALING DEFENDANTS FROM ACCESS TO AND
FROM CROSSING SAID BORDER STRIP IN ANY
OTHER MANNER WHATSOEVER.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS CHRISTENSEN HAVE NO RIGHT OF WAY
ACROSS OR RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE PREMISES
COVERED BY THE TRAUGOTT DEED OF 1907.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS: No. 8 ON PAGE 2 OF ITS FINDINGS;
No. 11 ON PAGE 3; No.1 ON PAGE 4; No.2 ON PAGE
4, 5, AND 6; No.5 ON PAGE 7; No.1 ON PAGE 8; No.6
ON PAGE 10; No.7 ON PAGE 10, BECAUSE SAID FINDING ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: No.1 ON PAGE 10 AND
11 OF THE FINDINGS ·AND CO-NCLUSIONS; No. 2
PAGE 11; No. 5 PAGE 11.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE DEFENDANTS TO REMOVE ANY AND ALL ITEMS
WHICH MAY POLLUTE THE WATER SUPPLY TO A
REASONABLE DISTANCE FROM THE SAID WATER
SUPPLY WITHOUT FINDING WHICH ITEMS, IF ANY,
EXISTING UPON ANY OF THE PROPERTY WILL OR
MAY POLLUTE THE WATER SUPPLY.

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESTRAIN
9
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PLAINTIFFS FROM BUILDING A FENCE OR OTHER
OBSTRUCTIONS ALONG OR UPON THE ONE ROD
STRIP OF LAND.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF
THE TRAUGOTT DEED (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT B) IN
THAT THE COURT PLACED AN UNWARRANTED AND
UNREASONABLE CONSTRUCTION UPON SAID DEED
BY LIMITING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE ONE
ROD STRIP OF LAND TO A POINT NEAR THE CENTER
OF THE ASHBY PROPERTY, AND EXCLUDING THE
APPEALING DEFENDANTS FROM ACCESS TO AND
FROM CROSSING SAID BORDER STRIP IN ANY
OTHER MANNER WHATSOEVER.

The proper approach to a question of this character
is set forth in the case of Sakansky, et al, vs. W ein,
et al, (N.H.) 169 Atl. 1. The court said:
''In this state the respective rights of don1inant
and servient owners are not determined by reference
to some technical and more or less arbitrary rule
of property law as expressed in some ancient maxim
. . . but are determined by the rule of reason. The
application of this rule raises a question of fact to
be determined by consideration of all the surrounding
circumstances, including the location and uses of both
dominant and servient estates, and taking into consideration the advantage to be derived by one and the
disadvantage to be suffered by the other one. The
rule is one of interpretation. Its office is either to
give a meaning to words which the parties and their
predecessors in title have actually used ... or else
to give a detailed definition of rights created by
general words actually used or whose existence is
implied by law.''

10
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The trial court appears to have considered 111ore than
anything else the use to which the one rod strip next to
the high,vay had been put by the various parties and their
predecessors in interest for crop production. Little attention was given to the right of way provisions of the
deed or the use of the strip by the defendants for road
purposes. Instead of construing the deed the court appears to have been guided by the thought that the law
as applied to prescriptive rights was controlling.
The law is well settled to the effect that "a right of
way by grant derives no strength from time or occupancy.
...c\. grant of yesterday is of equal validity to that of a
century past and even though the way may never have
been enjoyed, the grant is conclusive of the right.'' 17
Am. J urs. 939, Section 26.
A right of way created by express reservation in
a conveyance stands upon the same basis as a grant.

''A reservation of an easement in the deed by
which the lands are covered is equivalent, for the
purpose of the creation of the easement, to an express grant of the easement by the grantee of the
lands." Brown et al. vs. Christopher et al, 67 Utah
278, 247 Pac 503.
''Thus, a right of way may be created by a
reservation. It has been held that a reservation of
an easement in the deed by which lands are conveyed
is equivalent, for the purpose of the creation of the
easement, to an express grant of the easement by
the grant of the lands ... "
''The general doctrine of reservation of easenlents has been stated as follows: When it appears
by the true construction of the terms of the grant
that it was the well-understood purpose of the
11
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parties to create or reserve a right, in the nature
of a servitude or easement, in the property granted,
for the benefit of other land owned by the grantor,
no matter in what for1n such purpose Inay be expressed, whether it is in the form of a condition, or
covenant, or reservation, or exception, such right,
if not against public policy, will be held to be appurtenant to the land of the grantor and binding
on that conveyed to the grantee, and the right and
burden thus created and imposed will pass with the
lands to all subsequent grantees; and any grantee
of the land to which such right is appurtenant
acquires, by his grant, a right to have the servitude
easement, or right of amenity, as it is so1netin1es
called protected in equity, notwiths~anding his right
1nay not rest on a covenant which as a matter of
law runs with the title to his land and notwithstanding it may also be true that he may not be
able to maintain an action at law for the vindication
of his right." 17 Am. Jurs. page 942-943 Section 29.
It was conceded, of course, by the plaintiffs in the
trial of the case, that the defendants Ashby are entitled to
a right of way for road purposes over the narrow strip
of land covered by the Traugott deed. As a matter of
fact, the plaintiffs relied in the trial of the case upon the
Traugott deed to establish ownership of the property, and
the controversy between the parties should have simmered down to the construction of the Traugott deed~
The defendants conceded that the plaintiffs have the
'vater rights contended for, but took the position that
they (the plaintiffs) had the right to the unrestricted
use of their land not within the Traugott deed, and the
right to travel East and West as well as North and
South over the narrow strip.
The trial court took the position that the land on

12
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the North as it abuts on the narrow strip extending
bet,veen the pipeline and the public road is entitled to
but one point of access to the buffer strip, and that as a
crossing North and South. Further1nore, the court took
the position that when Ashby sold part of the land to
Christensens that the latter obtained no right of access
,vhatsoever to the narrow strip in question although
Ashbys deeded to Christensens -the land lying between
the Christensen home and the South quarter section line.
It follows that any further tracts sold by Ashbys must
go to the grantees without any right of access to the
highway to the South if the decree stands.
The narrow construction given by the trial court to
the rights of the defendants cannot be justified.
One having an easement by grant may assign that
easement, and it goes to every portion of the dominate
estate assigned, however many the tenants may be.
Methodist Protestant Church vs. Laws 7 Ohio CC 21,
4 Ohio CD 562.

In the old but leading case of Hills vs Miller,
2 Paige 245, 3 Am. Dec. 218, it is stated that ''as
the right is annexed to the estate for the benefit of
which the easement or servitude is created, the
right is not destroyed by a division of the estate
to which it is appurtenant. ·And the owner or assignee of any portion of that estate may claim the
right so far as it is applicable to his part of the
property, provided the right can be enjoyed as to
the separate parcels without any additional charge
or burden to the proprietor or the servient tenament."
It should be kept in mind that at the time of the original grant of the right of way the dominant estate con-
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sisted of all of the land immediately North of the narrow
strip over which the right of way for road purposes was
reserved, with other premises- 40 acres in all. Furthermore, we direct attention to the fact that where a reservation for right of way is made, the grantee in the deed is
in effect the grantor against whom the provisions should
be construed strictly since the reservation is really a grant
for the benefit of the dominant tenement. In construing
the Traugott deed this background must be considered.
There is no evidence whatever that there was any
established road way across the narrow strip at the time
the reservation was made, nor is there any evidence to
the effect that there is now an established road running
East and West or North and South across the strip in
question, except the Christensen road and one farther
East. The only evidence is that there is a gate in the
fence along the South side of the strip next to the canal
and the public highway, and this was used by the Woods
to gain access to their pipe line, and by Mikesell to whom
Ashbys had contracted to sell a tract of land before the
filing of the law suit. There never has been any defined
''right of way for road purposes'' across the premises.
There must, therefore, be a judicial determination
of what is the real extent of defendandts' right of way.
''In cases where the construction of a deed is
in doubt the language should be construed favorably to the Grantee. First Baptist soc. v. Wetherall, 34 RI 155, 82 Atl. 1061; Gaddes vs. Pautucket
Inst., for Sav., 4 RI 177, 80 Atl. 415, Ann Gas. 1913
B 407. This rule of construction is not altered because the portion of the deed construed grants an
easement 19 CJ 907, Section 94." Mateodo et al.
vs. Capaldi et al. (RI) 138 Atl. 138, 53 ALR 550,
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at 552.
''The detern1ination of the extent and nature
of an easement granted or reserved in express
terms by deed depends upon a proper construction
of the language of the instrmnent, fron1 an examination of all the material parts thereof, and without consideration of extraneous circun1stances,
where the language is una1nbiguous. But as in the
construction of deeds generally it is the duty of the
court to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the parties, and for this purpose it may consider
the situation of the property and of the parties, and
the surrounding circumstances at the time the instrument was executed; also a practical construction of the instrument given by the parties themselves by their conduct or admission will be considered in determining the intent of the parties
if the meaning of the instrument is doubtful. So
in accordance \vith well settled principles governing conveyances generally, the grant must be
taken 1nost strongly against the grantor in cases
of doubt. '' 19 CJ p 907, Section 94.
''A general right of way appurtenant to a tract
of land, not limited in its scope by the terms of the
grant, appertains to every portion of the tract, and
upon a division of the land a right of way will exist
in the owner of each of the lots into which it .may
be divided. It is not limited to the purposes for
which it was originally designed, but is available for
any reasonable use to which the property is or may
be put. Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush, 285, 290;
Whitney v. Lee, 1 Allen, 198, 79 Am. Dec. 727; }\ifiller v. Washburn, 117 Mass. 371, 374; Moland v.
St. John's Schools, 163 Mass. 229, 237, 39 N. E.
1035; Fox v. Union Sugar Refinery, 109 Mass. 292,
298; Parsons v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. 216
Mass. 269, 273, 103 N. E. 693; Brookline v. Whid-
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dren, 229 Mass. 485, 118 N. E. 981; Mahon v. Tully,
245 Mass. 571, 57 6, 139 N. E. 797.'' 47 A.L.R. 901.
"The mode in which an easement may be exercised is, in the case of an easement created by an
express grant, determined by construction of the
grant. The circumstances, however, under which
the grant was made are to be considered in determining the construction of the grant. So it is generally a question of construction whether the easement is limited by the use made of the dominant
tenement at the time of the grant, or whether the
burden of the easement may be increased with any
increase or change of use of the dominant
tenement''. Tiffany Real Property 2 vols. in One
Edition Sec. 321, pp 718-19.
A grant of an easement may be ''construed as
intended to convey an easement which shall appertain to the dominant tenement, in spite of any
changes, therein, and in such case the right to its
exercise will not be affected by any such change.
It is partly, perhaps, on this principle, that it is generally recognized that, upon the division of the
dominant tenement by conveyance to different persons, each of such grantees has the right to use the
easement as it was before used by the owner of the
entire tenement, without reference to whether this
increases the burden on the servient tenement.''
Tiffany p 724 Section 323.
The court's decision has the effect really of limitingthe right of way so as to be beneficial to only one narrow
tract, and of depriving the rest of land of the us~ of the
way bestowed upon all parts of it under the Traugott
grant. It also ignores the fact that the owners of the
dominant tenement have always travelled East and West
over the Wood strip for its full length.
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TESTI~IONY

ON USE OF ONE ROD STRIP FOR
RIGHT OF 'YAY PRIO·R TO FILING OF
LAW SUIT
:ill elvin G. Wood, one of the plaintiffs, testified as

follows:

'· Q Did you ever object to Mr. Clark or anyone
else traveling over the land owned by you going East
and West?
''A You mean across it?

'' Q In going East and West?
''A Going into the farm and out of the farm they
always went back and forth that way and used for
their own.

"Q And you never objected?

"A No"

(TR 87).

Howard Hale , a witness called by the plaintiffs,
testified as follows :

'' Q Did you travel over the South part of the property while you were working for Harrop?

"A y es, s1r.
.
"Q You often travelled over that part of the property?
''A Whenever I had occasion to go over that way
to look into the orchard.

''Q The whole part of it?
''A Well I never was over the whole thing.

"Q You went anyv;here you wanted to go?
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"A That is right"

(TR 33).

Joyce Harrop, a witness called by the plaintiffs,
testified as follows:

'' Q Did you travel over the South portion of the
property during the time you were there, or those represented by you, during that time did they travel over it?
''A Part of it, yes. We went up through the orchard on it.

'' Q You understood there was a right of way
covering the whole thing, if you wanted to use it?
''A Yes, that is the way we went back and forth
to the orchard" (TR 145).
In the face of this uncontradicted testimony offered by plaintiffs, the court entered a decree barring
all the defendants from travelling over the rod strip
East and West, and from using said strip at all, except
the decree permits Ashbys, and no one else, to cross
North and South at one specified point (See Court's
decree).
To construe the grant across the wood strip now
so as to limit the use of the right of way to one small
ren1aining tract is in equitable and unsound.
''The contention of the defendant that the
way was confined to farming uses, and was
limited to the purposes for which originally it
was designed is unsound. The grant was of a
general right of way. It is only where a right
of way is acquired by prescription or is narrowed by the terms of the grant to definite purposes that the extent of the easement is restrictnot by prescription, and is not limited in its
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scope by the tern1s of the grant, it is available
for the reasonable uses to \vhich the do1ninant
estate Inay be devoted." Parsons vs. N. Y. N.I-I.
N.R. Co., 103 NE 693.
In A1nerican Brass Con1pany YS. Serra, 132 Atl.
656 at 566 the court said: ''The language of the deed
indicates a grant of a right of way in general ter1ns.
'A grant of a right of \vay in general tern1s will
ordinarily be construed as creating a general right
of \Yay eapable of use for all reasonable purposes.'
2 Tiff on Real Property ( 2d Ed) p. 1332, Sec. 367.''
At page 567 of the same case the law is stated
as follows : ''. . . This long-constinued nonuser by
the owners of the don1inant tract of the easement
of way created by grant did not extinguish it. As
to the absence of a duty on the owner of the dominant tract to use a way in order to maintain title to
it, the law has been stated as follows :
'A person who acquires title by deed to an easement appurtenant to land has the same right of property therein as he has in the land and it is no more
necessary that he should make use of it (the easement) to maintain his title than it is that he should
actually occupy or cultivate the land. Hence his
title is not affected by nonuser, and unless there is
shown against him .... loss of title in some the ways
recognized by law, he may rely on the existence of
his property with full assurance that where occasion arises for its use and enjoyment he -vvill find
his rights therein absolute and unimpaired. Adams
vs. Hodgkins 84A 530. ''
Again at page 569: '' ... Minor and Wurtz on
Real Property, Sec. 108, makes the following general
statement of the law: 'An easement once created is
not extinguished by the mere acts of the servient
owner in themselves, however adverse they may be
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to the enjoyment of the easement by the don1inant
owner and however clearly they may indicate the
desire and intention of the servient owner to put
a stop to the use of his land. There must be added
to these acts other circun1stances showing an intention on the part of the dominant owner to abandon
or release the easement.' ''
In Bowers et al. vs. Myers et al., 85 Atl. 860,. at
861 the court held: ''. . . The authorities establish
the proposition that a right of way expressed in general terms is to be construed to include any reasonable use to which it may be put. Thus, in Jones on
Easements (1898) Sec. 375, it is said: "A right of
way granted or reserved in general terms may be
used for any purpose reasonably necessary for the
party entitled to use it. The fact that the person ~n
titled to such way has used it for one purpose only
for a long series of years does not restrict its use
to that purpose only. The grant being in general
terms, it must be construed to include any reasonable
use to which the land may be devoted.' ''
In the case of Peck vs. Mackowsky, 82 Atl. Rep.
199, the .grantor owned two pieces of land, only one
of which bordered highway. In conveying a piece
bordering- the highway he reserved ''for myself, my
heirs and assigns forever a right of passway fron1
the highway on the east to my land west of the railroad as now used.'' The remaining land was subdivided into two parts. The court states at p. 201
''. . . It is clear that the easement of way so reserved
was not a personal one, but one appurtenant to the
25 acre tract of which Barber retained ownership.
. . . As such, it attached to each and every part of
that tract, and the benefit of it passed to the plaintiff, as a successor in title to Barber of the entire
tract, and remains in him as the present owner of
the 6 acre portion of it.
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"For a deterntination of the character and
extent of the easen1ent reserved by Barber, we n1ust
look to the language of his deed, and, if that Ianguage is in any respect uncertain or ambiguous,
then to that language as read in the light of the
situation of the property and the surrounding circun1stances, to the end that the intention of the
parties 1nay be ascertained and given effect.... 'In
the construction of a deed or grant the language
is to be construed in connection with, and in reference to, the nature and condition of the subjectInatter of the grant at the time the instrument is
executed, and the obvious purpose the parties had
in view.' Walker vs. Pierce, 38 Utah 9497 ... 'A
right of \vay granted or reserved in general terms
Inay be used for any purpose reasonably necessary
for the party entitled to use it.... The grant being
general in terms it must be construed to include any
reasonable to use to which the land may be devoted.'
Jones on Easements, Sec. 375.''
In Hewitt vs. Perry (Mass.) 34 N.E. 2d 489,
at 491, the court said: " ... It is true that an easement granted in general and unrestricted terms is
not limited to the uses made of the dominant estate
at the time of its creation, but is available for the reasonable uses to which the dominant estate may
be devoted. Parson vs. N. W., N.H. & N. Ry. 216
Mass. 269, 7, 103N E. 693; Mahon vs. Tully, 245
Mass. 571, 577, 139 N.E. 797. See also Rice vs. Vineyard Grove C,o., 270 Mass. 81, 169 N.E. 664. It may
extend to the benefit of different parcels into which
the dominant estate may be divided. Anzalone vs.
Metropolitan District Commission, 257 Mass. 32, 36,
153 N.E., 47 A.L.R. 897. Compare Baker vs. Willard, 171 Mass. 220, 227, 50 N.E. 620, 40 L.R.A.
754, 68 Am St. Rep 445 ... ''
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS CHRISTENSEN HAVE NO RIGHT OF WAY
ACROSS OR RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE PREMISES
COVERED BY THE TRAUGOTT DEED OF 1907.

The effect of the court's ruling that the Christensens have no right of access whatever to any part of
the one-rod strip, extending in front of their premises,
is to hold that where there is an express grant of a right
of way inuring to the benefit of a large tract of land
abutting on the property over which the right of way
is to be enjoyed, and the owner or owners of the original
dominant tenement deeds away to one or more grantees
portions of the original dominant tenement that the
servient tenement is relieved of the original servitude.
That such a holding cannot be justified appears
clearly from reason and from the authorities cited under
POINT I.
While there is no express mention of a right of way
in the Christensen deed, yet Ashbys did execute and deliver to Christensens a warranty deed covering all of the
one rod strip lying South of the Christensen premises
(Defendants' Exhibit 3) and the Christensens thereupon
began to use a right of way across the one rod strip
as the only means of giving them access to the public
highway to the South (TR 102).
Easements appurtenant pass without mention in
deed. Levine vs. Chintz (Ia) 8 NW2 735; Greenwalt
vs. McCardell (Md.) 12 Atl. 2 522.
There isn't any question but that a dominant tenement may be sub-divided and sold without destroying
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the benefit of the ease1nent as to any part of land.
"·It is a general rule where there is an easeInent of \Yay appurtenant to a tenement, that the
subsequent O\vner of such a tenement has the right
of \vay as appurtenant to his particular part of the
land.'' Beginning paragraph of annotation 8
A.L.R. 1368.
. A. consideration of the nature of the one rod strip
of land in question will indicate that standing alone it
cannot be used to produce crops or for any other beneficial purpose, except as a means of protecting the plaintiff's water supply.
1\Ielvin G. vV ood, one of the plaintiffs, who is the
1nayor of Clearfield, testified as follows :

''Q You cannot use that little narrow tract, can
you?
''A I know it is very narrow.
j

'' Q The only use you could make of it would be
just to protect your water right?

''A That is right.
"Q That is the only use you have to make of it?
"A

That is right."

(TR 87)

It would, therefore, reasonably appear to have been
the intention of the parties to the Traugott deed that
the use of the strip of land in question was subject to
unlimited use for road purposes travelling East and
West as well as North and South, since the unlimited
use for road purposes would not interfere with the purpose for which the tract was conveyed to Wood, i.e., to
obtain the underground water.
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Loy Wood, one of the plaintiffs, testified as follows:

'' Q You never used that for any purpose except in
connection with the protection of your water there, is
that right?
"A That was it.

"Q Your sole purpose there is to get the water and
protect your water, isn't it, that is correct?
''A That is correct.

(TR 61)

The one-rod strip has really remained as part of the
tract to the North.
Lottie Clark, awitness called by plaintiffs, testified
as follows:

'' Q Mrs. Clark do you ever remember any mark on
the property by which you could distinguish where the
South part that has been referred to as the Wood property, and the North part are separated?
"A I do not."

(TR 42).

There never has been a fence along the North side
of the disputed strip, or any other fence except one to
the South of the strip.
Loy Wood, one of the plaintiffs, testified as follows:

'' Q Talking about fences, when did you first undertake to build a fence along the North line of the South
part of the pToperty, the part shown on the map?
''A The first time I ever tried to on the North side,
last Spring, '49.

'' Q Just prior to the beginning of the law suit is
the first attempt you ever made to put a fence along
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there?
'• A

That is the first time I ever tried to fence it.

•· Q Then you undertook to put a fence up north
of the well and you started east in that direction?

''_A_ What was that?

'· Q You atte1npted to start a fence North of the
well?
"'A \\T e followed the line given by the surveyor.

'' Q Including the one-half rod to the North?
''A Not including the one-half rod.

'' Q How far did you get with your fence?
"A I think half-way up with the posts.

'' Q Did you put that along the pipe line or along
the half rod that is North of the pipe line?

"A We put it along the pipe line.

'' Q That is the first time since 1907 you ever
attempted to build a fence along the North line?

"A That is the first time." (TR 59-60).
Melvin G. Wood, one of the plaintiffs testified as
follows:

"Q Up to this time there never has been any mark
running East and West across the land indicating the
South part that your claim is to separate it from the
part to the North.
''A No sir, there has been no fence posts to show
vvhere it was to go.

'' Q If we go on the land now, there is nothing ob25
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vious to indicate that to an individual, is there?
"A No." (TR 92).
Under that statement of facts, coupled with the other
facts hereinbefore referred to, we submit the court erred
in barring Christensens from buffer strip completely.
POINT III
THE c·oURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS: No. 8 ON PAGE 2 OF ITS FINDINGS;
No. 11 ON PAGE 3; No.1 ON PAGE 4; No.2 ON PAGE
4, 5, AND 6; No.5 ON PAGE 7; No.1 ON PAGE 8; No.6
ON PAGE 10; No.7 ON PAGE 10, BECAUSE SAID FINDING ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

It is submitted that finding No. 8 on page 2 of the
COURT'S FINDINGS is not supported by the evidence
since the finding sets it forth as a fact that the plaintiffs
and their predecessors in interest now are and for the
last 40 years have been the owners and in possession of
the strip of land in question. While there isn't any evidence but that the plaintiffs have an interest in said land,
neither is there any doubt but that the defendants are
entitled to free access to the said property.
The court erred in entering that part of finding 11
in which it is found that the defendants Ashby within a
year of the filing of the action either moved upon or permitted others to move upon the strip of land in question
certain pig pens. It appears conclusively from the evidence that the Ashbys at the time of the complaint were
living in the State of Idaho, and knew nothing about the
pig pens complained of (TR 109-110; TR 118), and
there is no claim Christensens knew anything about
the matter. The only person who could have been responsible was C. R. Ashby, against whom the action was dis26
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1ni~sed.

Neither is there any evidence that the Ashbys
cut any holes 'vhatever in the fence to the South.
The court further erred in entering the 2nd paragraph of finding 1 on page 4 in that it is not supported
by the evidence.
The court further erred in entering those parts of
its findings No. 2 on page 4, 5, and 6 of the court's
findings in which the court found that the defendants
have not gro,vn crops upon the strip of land in question.
The court further erred in entering its finding No. 5
on page 7 to the effect that the plaintiffs are entitled to
have their title to said property quieted as against the
defendants and that the defendants are entitled to no
relief under their counterclaim. The evidence shows the
plaintiffs have an undisputed interest in the land in question.
The court further erred in entering its findings No.1
on page 8 in which it is found that the plaintiffs have been
in undisputed possession of the property in question for
many years, and where it further found that the answering defendants ''have no right, titled or interest and no
right to use the property claimed by the plaintiffs as a
highway or a right of way to use the property as claimed
in the defendants separate answer". Said finding is directly in the teeth of the plaintiffs own evidence. ( TR
87; TR 33; TR 145; TR 86).
The court further erred in entering its findings No.
6 and No. 7 on page 10 because said findings are not
supported by the evidence.
It appears from the argument, and from the authorities set forth under Points I and II that it is erroreous to
27
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find that the plaintiffs have been "in open, notorius, adverse, hostile, uninterrupted, peaceable, continuous, exclusive, unmolested and undisputed possession of said
property", and that the plaintiffs are entitled to have
their title quieted to all of the property lying South of the
pipe line to the entire exclusion of the Christensens from
any easements therein and to the exclusion of the defendants Ashby except to the limited pin-point crossing North
and South at a designated point .
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: No.1 ON PAGE 10 AND
11 OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS; No. 2
PAGE 11; No. 5 PAGE 11.

The court erred in entering conclusion No. 1 on
pages 10 and 11 because said conclusions definitely are
against the evidence and definitely against the law applicable to the case as set forth in Points 1 and 2, because the Ashbys are entitled to travel East and West
as well as North and South across the premises in question and to have the premises unenclosed and open to
acce~s, and the Christensens are entitled to their easement over the property south of the pipe line because
they are the owners of part of the land for the benefit
of which the easement in question was created. This
position is sustained by the evidence and by the law as
hereinbefore set forth.
The court further erred in entering its conclusion
No. 2 on Page 11 in which it finds that the defendants
should be permanently restrained from using the strip
of land in question in any manner contrary to the deed
dated February 6th, 1907, without construing the said
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deed and by concluding that all items which pollute the
\Vater supply should be re1noved "\vithout designating
any iteins \vhich, as a n1atter law, have polluted or \viii
pollute the \Yater. The court further erred in concluding
that the counterclaim of the defendants Ashby should
be disnussed because the said defendants are entitled
to affirmative equitable relief fixing their rights to use
the strip of land in question traveling East and West
and North and South, and restraining the plaintiffs, and
each of them, fron1 interferring wifh the exercise of the
rights of the defendants in the strip in question.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE DEFENDANTS TO REMOVE ANY AND ALL ITEMS
WHICH MAY POLLUTE THE WATER SUPPLY TO A
REASONABLE DISTANCE FROM THE SAID WATER
SUPPLY WITHOUT FINDING WHICH ITEMS, IF ANY,
EXISTING UPON ANY OF THE PROPERTY WILL OR
MAY POLLUTE THE WATER SUPPLY.

On page 2 of the decree a permanent injunction is
entered restraining the appealing defendants ''from
1nolesting or using said property in any manner contrary
to the deed dated February 6th, 1907, and requiring the
defendants to remove any and all items which may pollute the water supply to a reasonable distance from said
property.''
There is no finding anywhere to the effect that at the
time of the trial of the case there was any" ite:r;n" of any
kind upon the stri~ of land in question which could pollute or which had polluted the water. The provisions,
therefore, are so uncertain and indefinite that no one can
determine what the court had in mind. Neither is there
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any evidence in the records that any of the _appealing
defendants at any time ever did any act that could
pollute the water.

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESTRAIN
. PLAINTIFFS FROM BUILDING A FENCE OR OTHER
OBSTRUCTIONS ALONG OR UPON THE ONE ROD
STRIP OF LAND.

It appears positively from the records that the
answering defendants, and each of them, have the right
to use the strip of land in question for right of .way purposes, and that they have the right of access to said
strip at any point to travel either East and West or
North and South, and that the plaintiffs should, therefore, be restrained and enjoined from placing fences or
other obstructions upon or along the tract in question
to prevent its use by the defendants. The court's decree
all the way through treats the land in question as the
absolute property of the plaintiffs, open only to the plaintiffs, while the defendants are in effect treated as trespassing strangers. If the decree is permitted to stand
as entered, the plaintiffs will be free to carry out their
intentions and build a fence along the pipe line, and maintain a deep trench along the North of the strip, which
trench they have constructed since the filing of this
action.

The decision of the court can lead only to confusion ....... .
and repeated misunderstanding. It permits the plaintiffs to act as ''dogs in the manger'' and take over
exclusive possession of the strip of right-of-way land in
question, while denying access to the strip to the defendants for a right of way for the property to the North.
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This is in the teeth of the fact that it is conceded that
the unlimited use of the strip for right of 'vay purposes
cannot and will not interfere 'vith the only use it was
intended for the plaintiffs to n1ake of the buffer strip
of land. The decree is unjust and inequitable, and is in
contravention of a reasonable and fair interpretation
of the Traugott deed.
CONCLUSIONS
It is the contention of the defendants that this is
a case in which the equitable construction of the Traugott deed definitely requires that the court take into
consideration not along the bare wording of t~e deed,
but the extraneous facts which must have been considered by the parties to the instrument. Obviously, a
one rod strip of land extending between a large tract
and a public high,vay would not be intended by the
parties as a means of permitting the grantee to landlock the owner of the dominant estate who reserved a
right of way for road purposes over the narrow strip.
We submit that the conduct of the parties in permitting the land constituting the narrow strip to remain
part of the larger area for all practical purposes, except
such use as would interfere with the plaintiffs underground water, indicates that from the beginning the right
of unrestricted access to the strip was intended to be conferred upon the owners of the land to the North.
We respectfully sub1nit that the defendants are
entitled to make the most beneficial use of their premises,
and that they are not limited to use the land for farming.
We further submit that it is inequitable to construe the
rights of the parties so that the Christensens are de-
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barred of any right of access whatever to the public highway, and from any access whatever to the right-of-way
strip.
We further submit that the decree of the lower court
must be reversed and changed so as to enjoin the plaintiffs from interfering with the rights of the defendants
in their access to the strip reserved for a right of way.
· In substance, it is necessary that the Supreme
Court place an equitable construction upon the situation
in the light of the entire background coupled with deed.
We submit that the decree of the lower court should
be reversed and a judgment entered in keeping with the
equities of the situation.
Respectfully submitted,
WILSON AND WILSON
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.
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